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Technologised Consumer Culture: The Adorno-Benjamin 
Debate and the Reverse Side of Politicisation 
Abstract 
This paper reanimates the Adorno-Benjamin debate to investigate the potential of contemporary technologised 
consumer culture to become a space for bottom-up political agency and resistance. For both Theodor Adorno and 
Walter Benjamin, the technological advancement of the twentieth century had an inherently irrational character, 
as evidenced by the self-destructive tendencies of humanity during the Second World War. Nonetheless, the 
thinkers famously disagreed when it came to the implications of the marriage between technology and mass 
culture. Discerning its potential for the mobilisation of the masses, Benjamin believed that technology would 
politicise mass culture, allowing society to employ it for its political ends – an idea which Adorno debunked. 
Technologised consumer culture has noticeably evolved since the time of the debate. Nevertheless, revisiting the 
debate is necessary to understand a sharp contradiction between the expanded possibilities for political 
participation and the return of the ‘auratic’ or cultic function of technologised consumer culture. At the same time, 
the paper shows that technology does politicise consumer culture. However, the pitfall lies in that the politicisation 
is done through technology as a tool, which is vulnerable to appropriation, granting those who are in the position 
to control it a substantial political resource. Consequently, the paper argues that the politicisation of consumer 
culture risks having a reverse effect of facilitating the aestheticising of politics – turning politics into a spectacle. 
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The Adorno-Benjamin dispute of the 1930s, which debated the emancipatory potential of mass 
art, is one of the most remarkable aesthetic controversies of the last century. Its magnitude was such 
that Walter Benjamin’s analysis of technological reproducibility of art – particularly his claim that it is 
‘completely useless for the purposes of fascism’ – prompted Theodor Adorno to continue to reply to 
Benjamin in his numerous works until his death in 1969 (Benjamin, 2003 [1939]: 252; Krakauer, 1998: 
50). For both Adorno and Benjamin, technological advances bear the danger of enabling large-scale 
manipulation and coercion. From this perspective, the fact that technological innovations have become 
an inseparable part of contemporary consumer culture is an issue that calls for urgent attention. At the 
same time, Benjamin’s account gives hope that the entry of technology into mass consumer culture 
could offer unique possibilities for its politicisation. Technology could transform consumer culture into 
a progressive force, building social resilience to any oppressive regime by virtue of the possibilities for 
political communication that modern technologies open. It is this idea that Adorno fiercely debunked.  
The noticeably evolved character of technologised culture that is widely consumed today seems 
to change the dynamics of the debate. The turn towards participatory web cultures and prosumption, 
whereby individuals stand simultaneously as consumers and producers, calls for a reconsideration of 
the debate. Revisiting the Adorno-Benjamin dispute, this paper aims to analyse the potential of 
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contemporary technologised consumer culture to become a space for bottom-up political agency and 
resistance. Indeed, if consumerism is so deeply entrenched into the fabric of modern society, one way 
to deal with it could be to employ technologised consumer culture for the political empowerment of the 
masses. In so doing, the paper examines the possibility of, using Benjamin’s term, politicisation of 
consumer culture through its interaction with technology. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, it reconstructs the two sides of the debate. Benjamin’s 
insights into the decline of ‘the aura’ and the transformation of art into a vehicle of political 
communication are counterpoised with an exegesis of Adorno’s critique. In dealing with the debate, the 
most important is to avoid approaching it from the position of who is right or wrong. As the following 
section illustrates, the debate reflects the ambiguity of contemporary technologised consumer culture, 
with its simultaneously progressive and regressive potentiality. On the one hand, in addition to 
endowing consumers with an agency, the new developments have provided unprecedented possibilities 
for social communication.  On the other, their consumption is an investment into the structures, which, 
on a wider scale, disempower society. The contradictory nature of technologised consumer culture 
accounts for the combination of a ‘progressive’ prosumer agency and the return of the ‘auratic’ function 
of technologised consumer culture with all the power hierarchies it maintains. The final section 
problematises the idea of politicisation of consumer culture through technology. It questions the extent 
to which such politicisation is able to transform the way society is governed, given the tendency of 
technology to grant those who have control over it a substantial political resource. Since its recruitment 
for specific political goals, contemporary consumer culture is de facto politicised, but differently to the 
bottom-up way that Benjamin envisaged. What can be observed today is the juxtaposition of the new 
possibilities for political mobilisation and the emergence of new mechanisms through which it can be 
manipulated. In this case, politicisation is no antidote to the aestheticising of politics. In fact, the former 
has already created favourable conditions for the latter, as exemplified by the growing use of social 
media by populist leaders for the dissemination of their political performances.    
The Adorno-Benjamin Debate 
Writing against the backdrop of Nazism, both Adorno and Benjamin saw its the roots to be in the very 
fabric of modernity and the latter’s abuse of technology. According to Adorno, the efficiency of the 
Holocaust and its technological sophistication were expressions of the progressive domination over 
nature by humans. The mastery achieved over nature and the thoughtless fetishisation of technology, 
whereby technology becomes the end in itself, ushered in the self-enslavement of humanity. For 
Benjamin (in Simons, 2016: 48), such ‘miscarried’ reception of technology is symptomatic of a 
fundamental perversion in the relationship between the accelerated technological growth and the 
relations of production. The horrors of war are the result of the ‘discrepancy between the enormous 
means of production and their inadequate use in the process of production’; between ‘the gigantic power 
of technology and the minuscule moral illumination it affords’ (Benjamin, 2003 [1939]:  270, 1979:  
120). When the only use of nature is ‘to dominate it and other men’, means and ends become conflated 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 4). Power, progress and technological advancement are now goals of 
their own deployment – a mode of reasoning known as ‘technological rationality’ (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997: 121). It is the rationality of domination per se, which has lost the very reason it 
claims to embody. 
In their analysis of the phenomenon of authoritarian irrationalism witnessed in the twentieth 
century, Adorno and Benjamin emphasise that the cultural life of society played an important role in 
enabling mass manipulation and control. According to Adorno (1975a: 12), the ‘culture industry’, which 
includes all the products ‘tailored for consumption by masses’, is a compelling mechanism of the 
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homogenisation and totalisation of society. Crucially for Benjamin, aesthetics played a substantial role 
in bringing the Nazi regime into power. The organisation and mobilisation of the masses were actualised 
through the ‘aestheticising of political life’ (Benjamin 2003 [1939]: 269). Hence, mass cultural events 
organised by the Nazi party always stood out with their essentially political undertone. The self-
alienation of humanity reached the point when it started ‘experience[ing] its own annihilation as a 
supreme aesthetic pleasure. Such is the aestheticising of politics, as practised by fascism’ (Benjamin 
2003 [1939]:  269). Indeed, its regalia and spectacles made Nazism perhaps the most aesthetically 
obsessed regime in history. As Wolin (1994: 184) puts it, fascism turned the self-destruction of 
humanity ‘into a grandiose and grotesque aesthetic pageant’, turning death into an object of aesthetic 
contemplation. 
If there were an early conclusion to be made at this point, it would be that consumer culture – 
its way of thinking, arts and institutions – is a powerful apparatus of mass mediation. Now, given the 
terrifying outcomes accompanying the technological advancement of humanity, what might be the 
implications of the entry of technology into consumer culture? In the wake of the omnipresence of the 
influence of technology in almost every sphere of contemporary consumer culture, it is vital to 
understand what Benjamin and Adorno have to say about this issue. Unexpectedly, here, their positions 
remarkably diverge.  
Benjamin and the Transformed Character of Art 
Warning against the juxtaposition of capitalism and technology, Benjamin, nonetheless, believes that 
the alignment of art and technology could bring the innervation and reinvigoration of the masses. 
Contrary to considering technology to be an enemy of humanity, Benjamin declares communism to be 
a harmonisation of the two (Simons, 2016). Bringing humanity and technology together is an essential 
goal because technology can liberate ‘human being from drudgery’ (Benjamin, 2008 [1936]: 45). In the 
wake of its historical transformation, art would play a prominent role in the empowerment of society. 
In his famous ‘The Work of Art’ piece, written and revised between 1935 and 1939, Benjamin 
develops his analysis of the impact of technological reproducibility of art on society. Accordingly, the 
advent of photography and the increased intervention of technological means in the production of 
artworks have led to a crisis of art, changing both its mode of reception. Mechanical reproduction of 
artworks has resulted in the devaluation of their authenticity and uniqueness and, more importantly, the 
disintegration of the ‘aura’ of art that they sustained (Benjamin, 2003 [1939]). The aura is the source of 
authority of the work of art in its cultic form. It signifies the embeddedness of the artwork in the sphere 
of tradition, its unique distinctiveness and spatiotemporal specificity. According to Benjamin (1969 
[1935]: 222), ‘the “sense of the universal equality of things” has increased to such a degree that it 
extracts it even from a unique object by means of reproduction’. The ‘exhibition value’ has overtaken 
the ‘cult value’; quality has lost to quantity.  
Contrary to lamenting the disappearance of the aura, Benjamin arguably welcomes it 
(Demiryol, 2012). Its withering emancipates the work of art from the dependence on tradition, within 
which art was meaningful only in relation to the ritual. Ceasing to be an element of magic, the withering 
of the aura emancipates art ‘from its parasitic subservience to ritual’, including the hierarchies and 
social distinctions that it maintained (2003 [1939]: 256). Benjamin believes that technological 
reproducibility gives rise to ‘new aesthetic techniques of representation and expression, which in turn 
produce new modalities of perception and articulation’ (Schweppenhauser, 2009: 120). In this historical 
transformation, Benjamin ‘delegates revolutionary Messianism to the technology of film’ as a form of 
art that is nothing but a result of compiling a series of separate images and scenes (Koch, 2000: 206). 
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Entering its realm, people experience a malleable world where any constraints can be superseded with 
the help of technology. Film also challenges the previously dominant private and solitary settings in 
which the reception of art took place, ‘collectivising’ the experience of art by making it more accessible 
(Demiryol, 2012: 945). Simultaneous collective reception positions it particularly suitable for the 
dissemination of political message. Finally, the audience now takes an active role of a ‘critic’, implying 
its critical relation to film (Benjamin, 2008 [1936]: 260). Thus, film can ‘train human beings in 
apperception and reactions needed to deal with a vast apparatus whose role in their lives is expanding 
almost daily’ (107-8).  
In the years preceding his death in 1940, everything pointed to the demise of art and its full 
utilisation by the Nazi regime. Given this context, Benjamin sees that the only choice is to politicise art 
– to employ it for the political ends of society that stand in stark opposite to those of fascism or 
capitalism. Indeed, the shattering of the aura opens up enormous possibilities for the political 
mobilisation of mass culture and emergence of social consciousness. The crisis of art means that ‘the 
whole social function of art is revolutionised’, and the relation of the masses to culture changes 
(Benjamin, 2003 [1939]: 257). Art has become mass art. The revolutionary potential of the 
technological reproducibility lies in the fact that it coincides with the earning of the masses for cultural 
and political self-determination. The politicisation of art encourages direct participation of the masses 
in the production of art, who are now critical of their conditions as a subject and endowed with power 
over cultural production. As a result, the social function of culture shifts its status as an object of 
aesthetic satisfaction to a tool of political communication.  
Adorno’s Critique  
Technologies of aesthetic reproduction, Benjamin believed, will transform not only culture, but the 
whole of society. The confluence of art and technology will end bourgeois, authoritarian privilege and 
prepare the conditions for the emancipation of society. For Adorno, this same confluence has had a 
reverse effect. Adorno agrees with Benjamin that technological reproducibility has stripped the work 
of art of its unique artistic quality. However, whereas Benjamin is open to the new immersive 
qualities of film, Adorno is much more sceptical about the marriage between technology and culture. 
In fact, as D'Olimpio (2015: 623) said, ‘Adorno feared the advent of the Hollywood Studio film as 
akin to Nazi propaganda’. This section examines Adorno’s critique, which is vital for the critical 
engagement with contemporary transformations of technologised consumer culture in the sections 
thereafter. 
For Adorno, Benjamin’s fatal oversight lies in not being attentive enough to the manipulative 
and administrative employment of technologised culture that made Auschwitz possible. According to 
Adorno (in Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 120), ‘films, radio and magazines make up a system which 
is uniform as a whole and in every part’. Mass media is ‘democratic’ merely in the sense that ‘it turns 
all participants into listeners and authoritatively subjects them to broadcast programmes which are all 
exactly the same’ (122). It is also successful in responding to popular demand, however simulated it 
might be. Otherwise, mechanical reproduction has totalised society from above, ensuring that every 
detail is ‘stamped with sameness’ (128). Mass media, whose coming Benjamin celebrates, cannot be 
revolutionary because it inevitably originates from the same technological production process, in the 
same economic conditions, as that which incubated fascism. The origin of mass media stems from 
neither a ‘primary concern for the masses, nor of techniques of communication, but of the spirit which 
sufflates them, their master’s voice’ (Adorno, 1975a: 12). In short, contemporary technological 
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capabilities have simply facilitated the feeding of pre-digested cultural products to the masses, forcing 
their conformity and obedience. 
Both Benjamin and Adorno can appreciate the magnitude of the ability of film to alter the 
human understanding of the world. However, contrary to being revolutionary, for Adorno, this ability 
merely restricts thinking to the limits dictated by film-makers and, by extension, the current system of 
relations. The audience is too afraid to lose the thread of the story to be able to think beyond it (Adorno 
and Horkheimer, 1997). Thus, the problem is not so much in the passive consumption of visual 
narrative, as in that spectators are too active, yet in a superficial way. Meanwhile, film presents a 
distorted version of society consisting of a set of isolated moments. Adorno (in Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1997: 132) sees ‘the montage character of the culture industry, the synthetic, controlled mode of 
production of its cultural objects’ as being key to controlling social perception. For Adorno, such 
representation eludes society in its totality, with all its contradictions and irrationality. It is the purpose 
of the culture industry to distort reality by fragmenting it into storylines in such a way as to simulate 
the resolution of contradictions and give a sense of rationality to the world.  
Challenging Benjamin’s belief in the intrinsic revolutionary spirit of the masses, Adorno (1977: 
125) stresses that their interest in political empowerment does not change the fact that the masses ‘bear 
all the marks of mutilation of the typical bourgeois character’. Like Benjamin, Adorno agrees that the 
cinema creates a perfect environment for the masses to influence each other’s opinions. However, for 
Adorno (in Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 154), this is a prime testament of the illusion of individuality 
given by culture industry, for the individual opinion ‘is tolerated only so long as [its] complete 
identification with the generality is unquestioned’. The proximity of art only facilitates the alienation 
and ‘the progress of barbaric meaninglessness’, making them even more inescapable (160). The result 
of the technological reproducibility of culture is ‘the reduction of people to silence, the dying out of 
speech as expression, the inability to communicate at all’ (Adorno, 1985: 271). If the Enlightenment is 
‘the progressive technical domination of nature’, then the culture industry is the result of the 
Enlightenment turning against itself into ‘mass deception’ (Adorno, 1975a: 18). It eradicates, Adorno 
(19) concludes, ‘autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for 
themselves’. 
Adorno, Benjamin or Both? 
The simplicity of the question is discharming. It seems that the Adorno-Benjamin dispute has no 
imminent potential for resolution, thus, acquiring a form of antinomy, whereby neither of the positions 
can be sacrificed to one another (Wolin 1994: 197). Both perspectives have their shortcomings when 
taken individually. If implemented prematurely, Benjamin’s solution risks heralding the false 
politicisation of aesthetics that could result in furthering the integration of mass culture into the 
exploitative social relations. At the same time, since the emergence of revisionist scholarship of 
audience reception in the 1980s (Fiske, 1986, Hall, 1980), Adorno has repeatedly come under scrutiny 
for not accounting for the presence of consumer resistance in the marketplace (Schor, 2007). Cultural 
and media studies scholars have debunked the assumption that consumers respond to the meanings 
promoted by culture industries in fixed, pre-determined ways (Rodríguez-Ferrándiz, 2014, Zajc, 2015). 
Hall (1980) notedly argued for the necessity of breaking with the passive conceptions of the ‘audience’, 
reconceptualising it as an active and creative producer of meaning. According to Hall (130), in order to 
‘have an effect’, entertain or persuade, the message promoted by the culture industry ‘must first be 
appropriated as a meaningful discourse and meaningfully decoded’. Adorno’s refusal to recognise it 
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meant that he relinquished seeking for political communication at the level that would be accessible to 
the masses, rather than exclusively ‘to a coterie of specialists’ (Wolin, 1994: 208).  
It is also important to avoid overstating the divergence between Benjamin’ and Adorno’ 
accounts. Adorno (in Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 121) admits that the manipulative function is not 
inherent to technology itself: it is ‘the result not of a law of movement in technology as such but of its 
function in today’s economy’. Meanwhile, Benjamin acknowledges that culture is going right in the 
opposite direction to the one he anticipated – commodification. Contrary to the dominant perception, 
Benjamin is aware that the new media is not intrinsically liberating and can be used both for 
emancipation, as well as manipulation. According to Benjamin (1969 [1935]: 231), insofar ‘as the 
movie-makers’ capital sets the fashion, as a rule no other revolutionary merit can be accredited to 
today’s film than the promotion of a revolutionary criticism of traditional concepts of art’.  
The next section shows the way in which the contradictory nature of the debate captures the 
simultaneously progressive and regressive potentiality of contemporary technologised culture. 
Technologised Culture Today 
Technologised culture has significantly evolved since the time Adorno and Benjamin undertook their 
writing in the 1930-40s. Creating new patterns of consumer-to-consumer and consumer-to-production 
networks, digital media has blurred the distinction between production and consumption. The turn 
towards prosumption, whereby the user is simultaneously a consumer and a producer, has been one of 
the revolutionary changes taking place in the history of consumer culture. It has led to an ongoing shift 
in the power relations between culture industries and consumers (Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010). 
Consumers now appear as an active subject, consuming and producing culture. As a start, the masses 
find a way to express their agency in the production of online content. The audience can actively 
participate in the creation and distribution of online content. User expertise is increasingly integrated 
into producer models of development activities, which was unimaginable during the prevalence of press 
and electronic media as mass media (Roberts and Cremin, 2017). Perhaps, just like Benjamin envisaged, 
consumers are starting to realise that they can be emancipated from oppressive social relations by taking 
advantage of new technological developments, which are far more accessible than ever before. 
Technologised consumer culture can have a specific educative role because consumers learn to 
deconstruct the established patterns of production and reception. 
In addition to endowing consumers with an agency, the ‘new’ participatory web cultures have 
provided unprecedented possibilities for social interaction. Millions of individuals interact daily through 
social network sites, such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and Snapchat, which encourage and facilitate 
social communication. A stupefying range of interfaces delivering media to people has provided infinite 
resources for collaborative social production and massively expanded online choice (in quantitative 
terms). The abundance of websites, digital compression technology and decentralised media production 
have replaced the monopoly of handful broadcast channels and print titles (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010). 
Taking YouTube as an example, it is a vast, affordable and unregulated social platform. YouTube 
enables various actors, regardless of gender, race, age and body, to discuss and post audio-visual 
material. The same applies to other user-generated content sites, including Flickr and Wikipedia, where 
amateurs and professionals can exchange their content. Another distinctive type of social media consists 
of game streaming sites, such as Twitch and YouTube Gaming, where users can interact with streamers 
through comments or tips. 
Far from being redundant in the context of prosumption, the Adorno-Benjamin debate is central 
in interrogating the implications of continually evolving technologised consumer culture. In particular, 
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the soundness of Adorno’s critique becomes clear once one recognises that there is a different side of 
prosumption. First, prosumption does not automatically translate into a diversity of ideas, voices and 
perspectives. Most of the user-generated content either adopts the templates and standards established 
by the professional entertainment industry or overtly reuses professionally created content (Zajc, 2015). 
These standards are, of course, not without their gender, class, age and racial biases, often promoting 
majoritarian logic (Jenkins, 2009). Furthermore, although there is little or no charge to use online 
services, this time it is corporations that pay for the ability to reach users (Roberts and Cremin, 2017). 
According to Fuchs (2015: 163), ‘constant online activity is necessary for running and targeting 
algorithms for generating viewing possibilities and attention for ads’. The audience itself, its 
consumption habits and search history, has long been the principal commodity on sale while receiving 
no pay in return (Curran et al., 2016). Such data can be used to generate profit in various ways, namely 
advertising, as in the case of Google’s advertising suite. The very act of communication through social 
media between users generates value for corporations. At the same time, while the agency of prosumers 
brings unprecedented profits to corporations, an overarching majority of prosumers are paid next to 
nothing in return. 
The rise of prosumption also means that the focus of profit-making is now on the creators of 
user-generated content, who provide instant access to a tailored audience, with whom they already have 
a strong bond of trust. ‘Social influencers’ enable advertisers not only to identify and target desirable 
audiences, but also to actively influence and manipulate consumers by abusing their trust of the creator. 
Popular streamers on Twitch and YouTube, such as Felix Kjellberg (PewDiePie) or Casey Neistat, as 
well as social influencers on Instagram, such as Kim Kardashian, have come under continued criticism 
for their failure to disclose sponsorships. On balance, as Schor (2007) explains, consumer society works 
through prosumer agency rather than against it. The success of companies depends on their skill to sell 
agency to consumers. Notwithstanding its affordability, interactivity and visibility, prosumer agency is 
no obstacle to the logic of commodification. Uber, a ride-sharing service, is often portrayed as a 
revolutionary company poised to disrupt long-established monopolies of taxis and car-hiring services. 
However, the fact that its drivers are recognised not as full-time employees in most countries, but as 
‘registered partners’ deprives them of the entitlement to the payment of benefits and job security, as 
they can be fired anytime without severance (Dudley et al., 2017: 493).  
On a fundamental level, technologised consumer culture remains highly integrated into existing 
economic interests. In this light, Miles (1998a: 1006) rightly introduces what can be characterised as 
the ‘consuming paradox’. As such, consumerism enables self-expression through material and symbolic 
means, while sustaining a dominant system that, on a grander scale, constrains personal freedom. This 
shows that consumer culture is at once enabling and constraining (Miles, 1998a, Zajc, 2015). In fact, 
the key to the success of consumerism lies in that, despite having at least a partial awareness of its harm, 
consumers are willing to explore its effects (Miles, 1998b). Contemporary technologised culture is 
equally paradoxical. It is, by no means, a straightforward extension of the power of the producer that is 
obediently consumed by docile individuals. Technologised culture has provided individuals with 
unprecedented opportunities for constructing their own meanings and communicating them to wide 
audiences. Yet, the potential that it opens for communication, individuality and self-fulfilment also 
paves the way for a more omnipotent control over them. The creative, ‘agentic’ prosumer culture is still 
an investment into the system of market exchange (Schor, 2007). Therefore, seeing technologised 
culture either as a source of empowerment or a path towards mass obedience would be one-sided, for 
its impact is much more intricate. Indeed, consumers appear in a constant battle with themselves, trying 
to come to terms with the tensions that the consuming experience entails (Marsh, 1982). 
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The question then is why, despite being at least partially aware of their role in sustaining the 
ultimately disempowering social structures, do people continue to consume technologised cultural 
products? At this juncture, Adorno speaks of consumption as being injected with irrationality, for the 
gratifications that it provides alleviate no real problems. Nor do they bring any long-term emancipation. 
There is merely a momentary feeling that contradictions are resolved, ‘the release of one’s own feeling 
of unhappiness’ (Adorno in Cook 1994: 23). It is important to note, however, that, in recent years, 
research has been done to show that consumption is not limited to the search for enjoyment or 
momentary pleasures (Brock 2017; Illouz, 2009). Adorno’s overly simplistic assessment of the 
motivations behind consumption can benefit from incorporating the concept of emotion (Illouz 2009). 
Illouz (2009: 383) demonstrates that emotion is the ‘energy-laden’ side of human action, which 
‘implicate[s] cognitions, affect, evaluation, motivation and the body’, propelling the act of 
consumption. Instead of simply being a means of gratifying desires, commodities provide emotional 
meanings and experiences. The emotions arising from consumption ‘are experienced on the imaginary 
mode’ and do not pertain to ‘real’ social relations or ‘actual’ experiences (Illouz 2009: 397). In doing 
so, the effectiveness of consumption lies in its power to propel individuals ‘into a realm of possibilities 
entertained through the exercise of imagination’ (Illouz 2009: 398). Consumption simulates the 
sensations that the ‘authentic’ experience of individuals would entail. 
The writings of Jean Baudrillard (1983, 1988) are particularly helpful in understanding the 
power of the non-simulated experience. Baudrillard (1983) observes the replacement of reality with a 
simulated reality – a ‘hyperreality’. With the advent of hyperreality, the nostalgia for non-simulated 
experiences and the craving for authenticity assume their full meaning. The result of living in a 
technologically reproduced world of signs is the emergence of the cult of the lived experience in its 
fundamental banality. This is exemplified by social networking sites and the overwhelming amounts of 
information about people’s mundane lives they contain (Beer and Burrows, 2010). The consumption, 
or rather prosumption, of the mundane involves anything from daily checking of friends’ pictures on 
Instagram to watching YouTube videos of mundane activities, such as driving a car or brushing teeth. 
The interest in the everyday experience is also evident in a constant stream of news stories about 
celebrities’ daily life and an increasing popularity of social media accounts managed by celebrities. The 
ability to reach celebrities through ‘unmediated’ channels, such as Twitter or Instagram, has a special 
charm since it fosters the illusion of intimacy (Gerds, 2011). Therefore, technologised consumer culture 
is predominantly concerned with the production, and overproduction, of ‘authentic’ experiences. This 
is increasingly amplified by prosumers, many of whom have capitalised on the desire of their followers 
to hear honest opinion while acting as corporate agents.  
Technologised consumer culture appears to be full of contradiction since the agency it grants 
its consumers can take many ‘not-so-progressive’ forms. What the striving for even the banalest 
authenticity shows is that, contrary to Benjamin’s predictions, the marriage of technology and mass 
culture does not lead to the disappearance of the irrational, cultic function of cultural consumption. 
According to Adorno (1975a: 15), mass culture ‘does not strictly counterpose another principle to that 
of aura, but rather […] conserves the decaying aura as a foggy mist’. The aura now has ceased to be 
tied to distance and autonomy and is now based on immersion into authentic experiences (Simkins and 
Steinkuehler, 2008; Vassiliou, 2010). With the recent technological developments, particularly those 
associated with virtual and augmented reality, there is a growing quest for more intense sensations from 
the world of the spectacular. The pursuit of authenticity simultaneously through and in spite of 
technological reproducibility is a response to the discrepancy between the new possibilities for 
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consumer agency and the strengthening of wider structures that subvert it. Although there is no return 
to passive forms of consumption or old aesthetical values, the auratic quality of contemporary 
immersive technologies can be counterproductive to social consciousness. As Buck-Morss (1992: 23) 
elucidates, ‘[s]ensory addiction to a compensatory reality [is] a means of social control’. Consequently, 
consumption can divert social energies into the search for the authentic and away from challenging the 
broader, profoundly unequal structures.  
The Intertwinement of Politicisation and Aestheticisation  
The emergence of new technologies has not destroyed the auratic function of consumer culture. 
However, does it necessarily render the idea of politicising consumer culture impossible? Does the 
argument that, for example, social media seems to encourage citizens’ political expression and 
participation not prove the reverse (Loader et al., 2014)? Finally, is the preservation of unequal 
structures behind technologised consumer culture a reason for scepticism about the effects of its 
politicisation? 
There is enough evidence that digital culture has the potential to improve political participation. 
Studies have shown that social media has politically engaged previously inactive participants who now 
enjoy greater knowledge about current affairs (Curran et al., 2016; Koc-Michalska et al., 2015). Being 
a member of a political Facebook group is linked to a stronger likelihood of engaging in online, but also 
traditional political participation – from signing online petitions to voting (Loader et al., 2014; Vissers 
and Stolle, 2014). Social media makes nearly every topic a political issue (abortion, homosexuality, 
cultural appropriation, vegetarianism), uniting separate publics around specific causes. The sheer 
number of ‘Twitter Revolutions’ – including the 2010-11 Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, the 2011 
Egyptian Revolution and the 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine – suggests that technologied 
culture can be a training ground for collective innervation of society. Beyond social media, Simkins 
and Steinkuehler (2008) have shown the potential of video games to foster critical ethical reasoning 
skills by providing simulated social spaces in which players can practice making significant decisions 
within their games. The belief that making democracy fun can make it work guided the creators of 
Democracy, a political strategy video game, which puts players in the position of key government 
decision-makers. Overall, both social media and video games can contribute to making democratic 
participation more appealing.  
From frivolous entertainment, technologised consumer culture is starting to be perceived as a 
unique platform for social critique and political resistance. It is premature, however, to prescribe social 
media and video gaming as activities for enhancing political participation due to the lack of any 
conclusive evidence. Caution is also needed because social mobilisation does not mean the ability to 
affect hierarchies of power. Likewise, the ease of access and participation does not cancel out the 
monopoly of control of the Internet by large service providers. The assumption of a causal relation 
between digital culture and democratic change also omits the use of the Internet for non-democratic 
purposes, including state surveillance, manipulation or deliberate disinformation, as in the case of 
Russia (Christensen, 2011). The cardinal task is to understand what prevents the new forms of 
engagement from becoming a force that transforms the way society is governed and empowers citizenry 
rather than political elites. This is where the Adorno-Benjamin debate is important.   
The fundamental problem that revisiting the debate uncovers is that the heavy impact of the 
hegemonic social structures on technology exceeds the impact that the latter is capable of exerting on 
them. Recalling Benjamin’s (1969 [1935]) analysis, whereas technological innovations progressively 
subvert the hierarchical foundations of art, the power-holders in society immobilise this development 
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by regaining control over technology. The result is a cyclical process, whereby technology reproduces 
the social structures that, in turn, invest in technology and sustain a flourishing environment for its 
development. As technology becomes an economic/corporate enterprise, its incorporation into culture 
deprives the revolutionary potential of mass culture. More importantly, it makes the cultural life of 
society a site of manipulation. Technological consumption masks the power it represents, giving those 
who have control over it a substantial political resource. As Miles (1998b: 83) puts it, when technology 
appears in the wrong hands, it can ‘be used actively to accentuate counterproductive power 
relationships’. It is in the interests of the established elites to maintain the aura around the consumption 
of cultural goods. The preservation of inequality of power behind technologised consumer culture 
produces an illusion of the latter being a progressive force, at the time when its auratic function appears 
in a disguised form. 
However, from this, it should also be deducted that technologised consumer culture does appear 
to be politicised. Yet, this politicisation is done through technology as a tool, which has ceased to be 
neutral and started serving particular interests. Without being liberated from its subservience to 
social/economic/ideological hierarchies, technologised consumer culture organises and directs social 
energies in the way that is most suitable to maintain those hierarchies. Since its recruitment for specific 
political goals, consumer culture is de facto politicised, but contrary to the bottom-up way that Benjamin 
envisaged. Furthermore, according to Benjamin, the existing power-holders do not simply rely on the 
preservation of the auratic function of consumer culture to maintain their power. They also turn politics 
into a cult by aestheticising it as a means of manipulating people (Benjamin 1969 [1935]). For example, 
Benjamin observes that fascism aestheticised politics through its uses of art in ceremonies, political 
speeches, on the staging and communication of political events through mass media channels – all with 
the aim to mesmerise the public. Jay (1992: 45) describes aestheticised politics as ‘the victory of the 
spectacle over the public sphere’. Consequently, the distinction between an aestheticised politics and a 
politicised culture is blurred in reality, as both can supplement each other. It is a troubling conclusion 
of the Adorno-Benjamin debate, but also the one that often escapes inquiry, that an aestheticised politics 
and a politicised culture can be two sides of the same coin.  
To quickly recuperate, the paper has shown that the persistence of the auratic function of 
consumer culture is no obstacle to its politicisation. Hence, the progressive merit of technologised 
consumer culture is limited mainly to the changes within the realm of technology itself. In simple terms, 
for the ordinary citizen, its progressiveness is observable in need to stay up-to-date with new 
developments, for example, by buying the latest version of iPhone or trying out new games. This 
contrasts with a comparatively smaller degree of actual revolutionary merit of technologised consumer 
culture in relation to the ability of citizens to make any difference in politics beyond elections in 
contemporary democracies or challenge the hegemony of neoliberalism. The expanded opportunities 
for activism and dissent do not guarantee the collapse of existing structures. Furthermore, it is also not 
the case that the politicisation of consumer culture necessarily supplants the aestheticisation of politics. 
A significant insight that one can elicit from revisiting the Adorno-Benjamin debate concerns the ability 
of the politicisation of consumer culture to lay the ground for the successful execution of the 
aestheticisation of political life. Essentially political issues become part of everyday aesthetic 
consumption to an extent that the latter overturns their political content. Likewise, nowadays, there is a 
strong parallel between the way technology endows consumer culture with a stronger auratic value and 
the way technologised consumer culture is subsequently recruited for political purposes.  
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Above all, it is populism that embodies at once an aestheticisation of politics and a politicisation 
of mass culture. The recent resurgence of populism, particularly in its right-wing form, has brought to 
light its performative dimension. More precisely, rhetorical (argumentation and tone) and aesthetic 
(fashion and design of surrounding environment) techniques employed by populists to attract supporters 
have been noted to be a defining characteristic of contemporary populist movements (Moffitt, 2016; 
Taggart, 2000). First that comes to mind is the simplicity and directness of populist rhetoric, which 
employs a ‘tabloid style’ – with its coarse language and slang – to portray affinity with ‘the people’ 
(Canovan, 1999: 5). According to Moffitt (2016: 56-57), populists take advantage of the fact that ‘a 
particular aura is granted to those leaders who can perform successfully for “the people” by combining 
strong leadership with interesting, “accessible” and entertaining personas’. Thus, populist leaders give 
prior importance to making themselves visible through televisual performances, ways of dressing and 
political incorrectness. In addition to incorporating performative or ‘theatrical’ elements into politics, 
populists, including Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, became one of the forerunners 
amongst political elites to recruit social networks for political communication and mobilisation. This 
allowed populists to distribute their political performances to a steadily growing mass audience and 
build strong follower bases (Dittrich, 2017). Their strategy proved successful because of the ability of 
social media to create a sense of ‘unmediated’ communication with the leader, given the culture’s 
striving for authenticity. By granting populists a platform to distribute their performances, social media 
reinforced the politicisation of consumer culture, thereby facilitating the populist aestheticisation of 
politics.   
The Adorno-Benjamin debate illuminates the dangerous convergence of the unprecedented 
technological transformations in consumer culture, the preservation of unequal power structures and 
(populist) politics. Reflecting on that danger is especially necessary in times of crises. Crises cause a 
rupture in the existing system and open space for new coercive regimes, which can capitalise on social 
media to gain mass support. The fact that technologised consumer culture is not under collective social 
control by extension conveys citizens’ alienation from political decision-making. In such 
circumstances, social energies stimulated by new technologies may be diverted into mass irrationality 
and destruction. As the Holocaust testifies, the annihilation of the Other, preceded by mass 
representations of its threatening and almost ‘inhuman’ guise, can become an upmost source of perverse 
aesthetic pleasure. The ability of politicised social media to mobilise enormous numbers of people could 
turn in into the opposite of a progressive force. It is at this point that the singling out of the ‘other’ can 
provide a sense of meaning and political action. Symptomatic of this is the scapegoating of particular 
Others – such as asylum seekers or minority groups – as enemies of ‘the people’. Hence, it is 
unsurprising that the online popularity of the German populist far-right party, Alternative für 
Deutschland, soared following the influx of Syrian refugees to Germany in the autumn of 2016 
(Dittrich, 2017: 6). While further analysis of populist spectacularisation of politics as well as populists’ 
interaction with technologised consumer culture is beyond the scope of this paper, a circumspection of 
these developments should be the next point of inquiry. 
Conclusion 
From the cinema to social media, consumer culture today is primarily a technologised culture, a site of 
virtual reality that knows no constraint other than the human imagination. Against the backdrop of the 
continuously changing digital environment, a sociology of technologised consumer culture demands 
circumspection as a vital tool. The paper has uncovered a number of issues that currently prevent 
technologised consumer culture from becoming a site of social empowerment and political resistance. 
On the one hand, digital media has provided new opportunities for consumer agency, blurring the gap 
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between consumption and production. On the other, as the article has argued, it is not yet a sign that 
technologised culture today is entirely in the position to be a driving force of social emancipation. In 
the long run, the consumption of technologised culture is still an investment into a ruthless economic 
engine and political power it sustains. It is through the conversation with Adorno that the ‘foggy mist’ 
of the auratic or cultic function of technologised culture unravels. Consumption is more often a source 
of immersion into ‘authentic’ experiences than political knowledge or resistance. Therefore, the entry 
of technology into consumer culture has provided means of political communication, but also reinforced 
the auratic function of consumption.  
Contrary to Benjamin’s predictions, not only do technological developments not destroy the 
hierarchies behind consumer culture, but the resurrected aura around the consumption of ‘authentic’ 
experiences also does not prevent the politicisation of consumer culture. This time, however, it is a top-
down politicisation that countervails a bottom-up innervation of society. Technology, indeed, politicises 
consumer culture, but in the sense of turning it into a political tool primarily in the hands of those who 
currently have a stronghold over technology. It is not to say that the outcome of technologised consumer 
culture is completely pre-determined, in which case this discussion would have no point. It is the 
existence of at least some progressive potentiality that technologised consumer culture that brings the 
need for a critical discussion of the obstacles that it faces. Importantly, at the point of the intersection 
between the cultic function of consumer culture and its politicisation in the interests of the dominant 
powers, politicised consumer culture is no antidote to the aestheticising of politics. In fact, 
technologised consumer culture provides a considerable platform on which political spectacles can play 
out, as exemplified by populist performances. Although at first sight an innocent development, its 
potential for manipulation requires urgent scrutiny. After all, Adorno’s (1973: 265) ‘new categorical 
imperative’ – ‘to arrange [humanity’s] thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself’ – 
has not lost its relevance today (Adorno, 1973: 265). 
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